Local NGOs and Firms in Mine Action
As more local nongovernmental organizations develop, establishing a distinction between local NGOs and
commercial companies has become a growing concern for potential donors. The differences between NGOs
and firms can be difficult to determine at times.
by Eric M. Filippino and Ted Paterson [ Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining ]

I

t is generally agreed that sustainable mine action requires finding
local solutions to the problems of mines and other explosive remnants of war. What is of more debate is the precise form these solutions should take.
Over the past 15 years, we have seen local commercial companies
and nongovernmental organizations play only a modest role in most
major mine-action programs.1 This low level of involvement suggests
that vital opportunities for enhancing the cost-effectiveness, sustainabi l it y a nd broader
impact of nat iona l
mine-action programs
may have been overlooked. Local NGOs,
for example, are often
limited to running lowcost m i ne-r isk education projects rather
than more expensive
demining operations.
The last 15 years
notwithstanding, the
situation is now evolving quite rapid ly, as
illustrated by recent
developments in Iraq
a nd Suda n, a mong
ot hers . I n nor t her n
Iraq, for example, responsibilities for mine-risk education and demining are largely entrusted to local organizations. In central and southern
Iraq, the creation of new local mine-clearance and mine-risk education organizations is being supported by the Iraq National Mine Action
Authority and by international NGOs. In Sudan, some local NGOs conduct modest amounts of demining.

Most not-for-profit organizations that provide significant benefits
to the general public, such as local demining NGOs, must accumulate
surpluses over time if they are to be sustainable and operate efficiently.
These accumulated surpluses are needed to provide working capital (e.g.,
to pay deminers, purchase insurance and rent equipment before the
NGO receives payment for its demining), to replace vehicles and equipment every few years and to cover the organization’s legal obligations
in the event that it must wind up its affairs (e.g., severance payments to
employe e s , rema i ning months of rental
a g reement s a nd t he
like). Thus, for many
not-for-profit organizations—including local
dem i n i ng NG Os—it
would be irresponsible not to manage their
af fairs so as to earn
a reasonable surplus
or f i na ncia l reser ve
for operations.
The distinction
between surplus and
prof it appea rs to be
unclear to reg u latory officials as well as
donors. This misunderstanding can lead to some unnecessary financial subterfuge: As one
administrator of a Bosnian NGO put it, “We are required to end the
year at zero, but there are positive zeros and negative zeros.”

“This low level of involvement suggests that vital opportunities for enha nc i ng t he c o st- ef fe c t ivene s s,

sustainability and broader impact of
national mine-action programs may
have been overlooked.”

Distinguishing an NGO from a Commercial Company
It is a common misconception that NGOs and other not-for-profit
organizations must operate to break even financially and that, should
their income exceed their expenses in a given year, they have improperly earned a “profit.” Surplus is the general term for the excess of an
organization’s income over its expenses for a period of time. Profit is a
specific type of surplus—one that is “appropriable,” or owned by legal
individuals (i.e., real persons or legally established organizations).
A profit-seeking organization operates with the intention of earning
surpluses that will flow, ultimately, to the owners. A not-for-profit organization may earn surpluses, but these cannot be taken by or used to
benefit, those people closely connected to the organization, such as the
founders, members of the board, managers or employees.
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Implications for Mine Action
Given the realities in the field, one can fairly ask the question:
Would it make much difference to anyone if, say, all the local demining NGOs in Bosnia, Mozambique or even Afghanistan were reincorporated as local commercial companies (or vice versa)? Indeed,
the argument could be made that the main “beneficiaries” of these
organizations, having a not-for-profit legal status, may be officials in
donor agencies who typically face much less paperwork when awarding grants to NGOs than managing competitive tenders open to commercial companies.
In terms of the difference—real or perceived—between commercial
companies and NGOs, it appears that there is a significant degree of overlap with some companies masquerading as NGOs. Furthermore, some
NGOs behave much the same as commercial companies, at least within
the demining field—operating as contractors just as demining firms do.
Because of this overlap, donors are unlikely to be certain whether a new

organization that purports to be an NGO is a “true” NGO,
with altruistic rather than profit-seeking objectives.
As a result of these complications, it is unclear whether
donors (and perhaps even local officials) are in a position
to distinguish “true” commercial companies from “true”
NGOs. If those financing mine action cannot distinguish
between local commercial companies and local NGOs,
why should such a distinction be important in the mineaction field?
Why the Distinction?
There appear to be two principal reasons why donors
draw a distinction between local commercial companies
and NGOs. First, the policies of donor and U.N. agencies often make it far easier to award grants than to organize competitive bids. In most cases, donor policies do not
allow grants to a profit-seeking firm, so these donors often
prefer dealing with local NGOs rather than with local
commercial companies.
Second, some donors actively promote the growth of
“civil society,” particularly as part of a peace-building
effort or to foster pluralism in former socialist countries.
In such cases, money may be far easier to come by for local
NGOs than for firms.
Administrative convenience is a very poor reason for
favoring NGOs over commercial companies, especially
when one cannot distinguish between “true” commercial
companies and “true” NGOs. Indeed, the probable impact
of such a practice is damaging to the reputation of “true”
NGOs. But the argument that favoring NGOs is warranted
in terms of fostering civil society also is unpersuasive.
A Better Approach: A Task Focus
A far better approach would be for donors, U.N. agencies and the mine-action center to focus not on the oftenblurred distinction between local commercial companies
and NGOs, but on the nature of the demining tasks.
Where a task is a clear priority and well-defined, the performance of the demining operator can easily be monitored and there is less chance the operator will use unsafe
procedures or demonstrate substandard work. Such a task
should be awarded by a competitive bidding process open
to any accredited organization that meets the prequalification criteria (e.g., demonstrated financial capacity and
experience). A fixed-price contract should then be awarded
to the organization submitting the lowest bid that otherwise meets the technical criteria.
Conversely, when what constitutes good performance
is not readily apparent (e.g., the operator in a remote area
will determine which tasks should be a priority) or when
the level of effort required to complete the task cannot be
gauged accurately (e.g., clearance of an urban area with
extensive rubble), the contract should take the form of a
“cost plus” agreement (contract or grant)—essentially hiring the organization and its assets to complete a set of tasks
that cannot be clearly specified in advance. This method
removes the incentive for the contractor to select easy tasks
that should not be clearance priorities or to do substandard
work that would endanger deminers or the general public.
In the cases in which the nature of the task cannot be
defined precisely, the agreements must allow the demining

Mohammed Karim Latif practices mine detecting in Maidan, Iraq, in 1999. The United Nations is training
the Kurds of the area to clear minefields.
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organization greater latitude. In return for this latitude, the contractor should be
held to a higher standard of accountability. Assessing the performance of organizations that enjoy significant leeway is a more complex matter and should be based in
part on post-clearance land-use surveys. These surveys will shed light on whether the
right tasks were done, the cleared land and structures reached the target beneficiaries
and the beneficiaries are satisfied with the quality of clearance.
In other words, monitoring needs to encompass not only the demining outputs (e.g., clearance was done according to safety and quality standards) but also
the nature of the outcomes (i.e., the socioeconomic benefits accruing to the target beneficiaries).
There is no evidence that NGOs perform better than commercial companies, or
vice versa; so, rather than focusing on the legal status of the implementing partners,
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which may tell little about the underlying
orientation of the organization and its managers, donors and the mine-action center
should focus on the nature of the demining
tasks and employ an appropriate contracting
mechanism for each type of task.
Moreover, the rapid expansion of local
NGOs has led to some searching questions.
In some countries, the explosive growth in
the numbers of local NGOs seems to ref lect
donor largesse more than true “felt needs”
on the part of local populations. Often the
local NGOs bore little resemblance to indigenous forms of sel f-help orga niz at ions.
Some so-called NGOs were created by governments (or by indiv idua l government
officials) as a way to capture some of the
international funding.
The NGO Advantage: Trust
There are situations, however, in which
local NGOs may have a potential advantage.
Where a country’s government barely functions or has little interest in the well-being
of citizens in remote communities, how does
one deliver essential public services—including mine action—in mine-affected communities? Often in such situations, it is extremely
difficult to monitor the performance of organizations working with remote communities.
Often the mine-action center is also weak
and underfunded.
When faced with such dilemmas, donors
traditionally have sought international NGOs
with established reputations and provided
them with grants that do not have detailed
performance targets—essentially, a “cost plus”
contract for a period of time rather than a set
of tasks. The international NGO then has the
flexibility to respond to the needs it discovers
in the remote communities. Typically, donors
select international NGOs rather than firms
in such cases because they trust the NGOs.
But what is the basis of this trust, and how can
local NGOs become trustworthy?
The Basis of Trust
There are two key elements underlying
the trustworthiness of an organization: motivation and governance, which we will discuss
in order.
The motivations of “true” firms and “true”
NGOs differ. “True” firms seek profits, while
“true” NGOs promote public well-being.
Motivation cannot be observed directly, however, so how do donors determine whether a
local NGO is a “true” NGO?
The answer is experience. Large international NGOs have extensive experience
that indicates they seek to promote public
well-being rather than focus on profits. As
local NGOs gain experience, they too can
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demonstrate their motivations are for public
well-being. But how does an NGO—whether
local or international—get the chance to demonstrate its motivation through experience in
managing projects if the donors do not trust
them in the first place? Initially, donors may
risk small grants for, say, mine-risk education
projects, but rarely the large sums required
for demining.
The answer to this question is governance. Successful international NGOs have
highly respected and trusted individuals on
their boards, who oversee the management
to ensure the NGO is run to benefit the public. 2 With respected board members, an NGO
has the opportunity to obtain donations and
demonstrate its motivations, leading to more
donations, thus, creating a virtuous circle.
What has been lacking in the development
of local mine-action NGOs—particularly for
expensive demining operations—is sound
governance. Most developing countries—
and certainly failed states where local NGOs
are most needed to deliver public services—
lack adequate legislation to require NGOs to
have proper governance systems. Donors and
established NGOs that wish to support the
development of local NGOs should encourage these organizations to go beyond existing legal requirements in their countries and
adopt best practices in NGO governance. 3
Managers of local NGOs that want to attract
increased support would be wise to institute
best practices on their own.
Conclusions
There is no evidence that NGOs perform
better than commercial companies in demining, or vice versa. So rather than focusing on the legal status of the implementing
partners, donors and the mine-action center
should focus on the nature of the demining
tasks and employ an appropriate contracting mechanism for each type of task. Where
the priority of a task and the level of effort
to complete it are clear, contracts should be
awarded via a competitive bidding process
(i.e., pay a fixed price for the task and then
monitor safety and the quality of the output). Where it is unclear which tasks should
take priority or when it is impossible to estimate the level of effort required for a complex task, contracts should be awarded on a
cost-plus basis (i.e., hiring a set of assets for a
fixed period of time and monitoring both the
outputs produced and the outcomes accruing
to beneficiaries).
See Endnotes, page 112
This article is excerpted from the GICHD’s
study, The Role of Indigenous Organisations
in Mine Action.4
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